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Lecture 12:
Mind & Reality
\def \ititle {Lecture 12}
\def \isubtitle {Mind & Reality}
\begin{center}
{\Large
\textbf{\ititle}: \isubtitle
}
\iemail %
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Q
What is the mark that distinguishes actions?
\citep{Davidson:1971fz}.
‘The problem of action is to explicate the contrast between
what an agent does
and
what merely happens to him‘
\citep[p.~157]{frankfurt1978problem}.
Frankfurt, 1978 p. 157
What is the mark that distinguishes actions?
Davidson’s View
It is intention (or justifying reasons).
Objection:
Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders
remind yourselves of the Argument from Spiders
Are We Sure Spiders Don’t Have Intentions?
\section{Are We Sure Spiders Don’t Have Intentions?}
\emph{Reading:} §Jackson, Robert R., and Fiona R. Cross. ‘Spider Cognition’. In Advances in Insect Physiology, edited by Jérôme Casas, 41:115–74. Spider Physiology and Behaviour. Academic Press, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-415919-8.00003-3., §Buehler, D. (2019). Flexible occurrent control. Philosophical Studies, 176(8):2119–2137.
Sam’s Objection to Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders
Good example of not trusting a philosopher
you were like well maybe they do have intentions right and i thought to
myself yeah and then i thought to myself after that conversation i
thought to myself steve you better go and like really check that you're
up to date on spiders you better check that you're really up to date on
spiders because if sam's objection works that's going to be embarrassing
right being refuted by a first year you know you're supposed to be like a
professor of philosophy and still the first year can take you down right
and it happens more than once happens more than once um on the other hand
that's what i like right that's why i'm here that's the good thing about
it
‘... concepts which are inapplicable to spiders and their ilk.’
Frankfurt 1978, p. 162
‘Many animals that do not have conceptual intentions flexibly exercise agential control.
[...] Spiders very likely do not have them’
\citep{buehler:2019_flexible}
Buehler, 2019
Why is this relveant?
1. There is a contrast between actions and mere happenings in the lives of spiders.
2. The contrast in the lives of humans is the same.
3. Spiders do not have intentions, nor do they deliberate about what to do.
Therefore (from 1 & 3):
4. The contrast in the case of spiders cannot be explicated by appeal to intention.
Therefore (from 2 & 4):
5. The contrast in the case of humans cannot be explicated by appeal to intention.
Jackson & Cross, 2011 figure 3
caption:
‘Portia labiata (left) from the Philippines stalking a spitting spider, Scytodes pallida (right).
Approaching head on would bring Portia into Scytodes’ line of fire. Instead,
Portia executes a planned detour by which it approaches this dangerous prey from the rear.’
‘Distances between Portia and the surrounding array are too far for
Portia to cross simply by leaping. The only way Portia can reach its
prey is to walk down to the floor and over to one of the two poles,
climb it and then follow the path to the prey. However, once on the
floor, Portia can no longer see the prey.’
‘P. labiata foregoes the detour and instead takes the shorter, faster head-on approach when the spider it sees in a web is a Scytodes female that is carrying eggs (Li and Jackson, 2003). This makes sense because Scytodes females carry their eggs around in their mouths. Egg-carrying females can still spit, but only by first releasing their eggs (Li et al., 1999). Being reluctant to release their eggs, egg-carrying females are, for P. labiata, less dangerous as prey.’
But is this prey-specific activity really evidence of planning? No!
Jackson & Cross, 2011 figure 2
caption:
‘Apparatus used for testing Portia fimbriata’s detour-planning
ability. Portia was on top of the central pole before each test
began. The prey item (lure made by mounting a dead spider in
life-like posture on a cork disc) (not shown) was on one of the two
ramps (whether on the left or the right ramp decided at random).
Portia viewed the prey while on top of the central pole but could not
see the prey when it went down the pole. By consistently taking the
route that leads to the prey, Portia demonstrates ability to plan
ahead.’
‘P. labiata foregoes the detour and instead takes the shorter, faster head-on approach when the spider it sees in a web is a Scytodes female that is carrying eggs (Li and Jackson, 2003). This makes sense because Scytodes females carry their eggs around in their mouths. Egg-carrying females can still spit, but only by first releasing their eggs (Li et al., 1999). Being reluctant to release their eggs, egg-carrying females are, for P. labiata, less dangerous as prey.’
‘Portia’s task always came down to choosing which one of two paths
would lead to the prey. Sometimes Portia had to walk past the wrong
pole before reaching the correct pole, and sometimes Portia had to
head directly away from the prey before accessing the correct pole.
Yet, regardless of the details and despite having no prior experi-
ence of taking or even seeing the paths available in the experiments,
Portia chose the correct pole significantly more often than the wrong
pole.’
‘... concepts which are inapplicable to spiders and their ilk.’
Frankfurt 1978, p. 162
‘Many animals that do not have conceptual intentions flexibly exercise agential control. [...] Spiders very likely do not have them’
\citep{buehler:2019_flexible}
Buehler, 2019
never trust a philosopher
opinions
There is the internet for that.
Although i'm not kind of really up with
facebooking my ticktock snapchats on twitter
and all that kind of thing (did I say it right?),
i do have the
internet so if i want an opinion i know where to go.
1. There is a contrast between actions and mere happenings in the lives of spiders.
2. The contrast in the lives of humans is the same.
3. Spiders do not have intentions, nor do they deliberate about what to do.
Therefore (from 1 & 3):
4. The contrast in the case of spiders cannot be explicated by appeal to intention.
Therefore (from 2 & 4):
5. The contrast in the case of humans cannot be explicated by appeal to intention.
Why is this just orange? Because showing that spiders can plan future actions
is arguably not enough to show that they have intentions.
It’s just that, having shown this much, it seems foolish to assume we know that they
lack intentions.
it's very important not to go too quickly so there's a temptation here
to say gosh you know the objection is right or the objection is wrong
but in doing philosophy we're thinking in slow motion so we want to go
very slowly here what are the options that we have
Options:
try a different line
switch animals
further explicate the notion of intention
intentions as elements in plans
vs
representations which somehow guide actions
Which would you choose at this point?
‘... concepts which are inapplicable to spiders and their ilk.’
Frankfurt 1978, p. 162
‘Many animals that do not have conceptual intentions flexibly exercise agential control. [...] Spiders very likely do not have them’
\citep{buehler:2019_flexible}
Buehler, 2019
Difficulty is going to be to able to combine the view that
spiders exercise agential control while holding that they
lack intentions.
Later we might see that Bach’s notion of ‘executive representation’
allows us to do this.
For what it’s worth (nothing), I have argued that just this
combination is possible. But doing that would take us too
far away from the more basic issues.
(Generality vs depth.)
1. There is a contrast between actions and mere happenings in the lives of spiders.
2. The contrast in the lives of humans is the same.
3. Spiders do not have intentions, nor do they deliberate about what to do.
Therefore (from 1 & 3):
4. The contrast in the case of spiders cannot be explicated by appeal to intention.
Therefore (from 2 & 4):
5. The contrast in the case of humans cannot be explicated by appeal to intention.
Can you maintain both of these?
Dilemma:
Horn 1: accept that spiders to have intentions
Horn 2: deny that spiders have intentions: the guidance of their actions depends on some other
kind of representations of actions.
But this appears to undermine any grounds to accept premise 2.
In one case the contrast depends on whatever kind of intentions humans have,
whereas in the nonhuman case, the contrast depends on different kinds of state.
So there are distinct contrasts that resemble each other, not one contrast.
Options:
try a different line
switch animals
further explicate the notion of intention
intentions as elements in plans
vs
representations which somehow guide actions
might be helpful to think about human infants ...
This is what we will do next, using an argument due to Bach.
But first let me wrap up what we’ve achieved
What is the mark that distinguishes actions?
Davidson’s View
It is intention.
Objection:
Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders [??]
\section{Bach’s Objection}
\emph{Reading:} §Bach, Kent. ‘A Representational Theory of Action’. Philosophical Studies 34, no. 4 (1978): 361–79. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00364703., §Bratman, M. E. (1984). Two faces of intention. The Philosophical Review, 93(3):375–405.
What is the mark that distinguishes actions?
Davidson’s View
It is intention.
Objection:
Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders [??]
Options:
try a different line
switch animals
further explicate the notion of intention
intentions as elements in plans
vs
representations which somehow guide actions
Bach offers a further argument
‘some actions are performed too automatically, routinely, and/or unthinkingly to be in any way
intentional.
There need be nothing intentional about scratching an itch [...]
There need be nothing intentional
about [...] ducking under a flying object.
fight scence from Chaplin’s the Kid around 27:15
Impulsive actions are not
intentional’
\citep[p.~363]{bach:1978_representational}.
Bach, 1978 p. 363
Use this to construct an objection to Davidson’s View
(along the lines of Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders).
But is the objection any good?
1. Ducking under a flying object is an action.
2. When you duck under a flying object, there is no need not be an intention you are acting on.
I was passing a farm the other day and there was a sign outside saying
‘Duck, eggs’. I spent some time trying to work out why they had used a comma
in that sign, then it hit me.
Therefore:
3. Intention is not the mark that distinguishes actions.
Why accept this premise? Is there any coherent view on which it’s not an action?
Is that what Bach actually says? No!
After being bitten by spiders, we should be more cautious here.
Seems a bit mad to suppose this to me, but it’s not a matter of opion.
We need arguments either way.
‘it is unclear whether we can appeal to a general intention to protect myself from flying
objects to explain [...] why my catching the ball [or ducking Bach’s flying object] is intentional’
Bratman, 1984 p. 395 footnote 26
\citep[p.~395 footnote 26]{Bratman:1984jr}.
\section{Conclusion on Action}
conclusion
In conclusion, ...
What is the mark that distinguishes actions?
Davidson’s View
It is intention.
Objection:
Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders
Bach’s objections from absent-minded, instinctive and impulive actions [??]
Frankfurt’s View
Action is ‘behaviour whose course is under the guidance of an agent’.
Two Problems:
What is guidance?
When is guidance ‘attributable to an agent’?
Consider that the spider’s movements walking on the web are guided by the web’s structure.
And similarly for your actions when driving on the roads.
(Guiding is not only something you do, but something that is done to you.)
Explanatory vs Justificatory Reasons
\section{Explanatory vs Justificatory Reasons}
\emph{Reading:} §Dretske, F. (2006). Perception without awareness. In Gendler, T. S. and Hawthorne, J. O., editors, Perceptual Experience, pages 147–180. OUP, Oxford., §Alvarez, Maria. ‘Reasons for Action: Justification, Motivation, Explanation’. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2017. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2017. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/.
this weekend i was walking to a party on saturday night on a muddy path in
the dark and i fell over a log i tripped over a log and i landed on my face
in the mud covered with mud in my party gear so that was a memorable event
but it wasn't an action tripping over the log was was not an action uh
whereas of course walking to the party was so what is it that distinguishes
actions it's not the actions are somehow the most memorable events in our
life what is it that distinguishes actions from other events in our lives
i arrived at the party you know rather covered in mud right which is not
the traditional way to arrive at a party
Steamboat Bill, around 59:30
‘we have to carefully distinguish explanatory reasons, the reasons why S does A or believes P,
from justifying reasons, S’s reasons for doing A or believing P, the reasons S (if able)
might give to justify doing A or believing P.’
\citep[p.~168]{Dretske:2006fv}.
Explanatory reason example: Steve arrived looking like that for the reason that the path was so muddy.
Justifying reason example: Steve walked to the party because he believed it would be more romantic.
Explanatory Reasons
Mark: factive (must be true); no point of view.
Why did Steve arrive looking like that?
- Because the path was so muddy.
Why did the sign fall over?
- Because the path was so muddy.
the explanation that you're giving here is much like the explanation
you might get for any other naturally occurring event one that didn't
involve an agent right so uh as i was walking along the muddy path
you know it was sort of waterlogged and dark and i noticed that there
wasn't just a tree that had fallen over but also one of the signs
pointing me in the direction of the well i guess it was the village
uh whatever it was it was dark i couldn't tell anyway the thing had
fallen over right why had it fallen over because the the ground was
so muddy right there was no firm ground to support the foundation for
that sign so in this case you've got an agent in that case you
haven't got an agent
Justificatory Reasons
Mark: nonfactive (can be false); agent’s point of view.
Why did Steve walk to the party?
why did i why did i walk to the party right now there i was with mrs b
and we were staying at a hotel at one end of basing stoke and the party
was somewhere else in beijing stoke not been to basingstoke before um
interesting place and i thought to myself you know what it would be
really romantic to take mrs b on a night walk under the moonlight to
the party
- Because he believed it would be more romantic.
what i didn't realize is that the path
essentially went via some derelict warehouses some power infrastructure
and a railway line and was covered with mud and completely unlit right
so this was not this was not romantic this was not romantic as it
happened
It wasn’t; it was too muddy.
what you're
appealing to here and giving the justifying explanation is not the fact
that it was romantic but the belief that i had that it was romantic or
that it would be romantic a belief that turned out to be false
uh now you might say look well steve uh maybe it was romantic in some
way but not not in any relevant way so if i was taking not mrs b but
princess fiona then you know perhaps it would have qualified as
romantic
and although mrs b clearly like fiona descends from ogres
she's not really into you know muddy walks big pools of water tree
trunks anyway that kind of thing right she wasn't impressed whatsoever
This is not to say that justificatory reasons have to be false, just that they may be.
so the important thing here is that when we're giving the justifying
reasons the considerations that we're giving are not necessarily facts
the reason that justifies my choice of approach to the party walking as
opposed to taking our bikes or getting a taxi is something it's a
consideration which is not a fact it's a consideration that it would be
romantic it wasn't romantic has the consideration linked to the action
by my belief in this case so one of the things about explanatory versus
justifying reasons is that the explanatory reasons have to be factive
whereas the justifying reasons are non-factive so if you go back to
that sign and i say why did the sign fall over because it was muddy if
it turns out that it wasn't muddy then i haven't given you an
explanation at all when we come to the justifying reasons it's
completely irrelevant whether walking to a party in beijing stoke along
a dark unlit muddy path is romantic or not right that can still be the
justifying reason
second thing about justifying reasons is that they're going to capture
the agent's point of view right the choice that i made is explained
from my point of view by consideration which i took to be an
explanatory reason but we just turned out wasn't an explanatory reason
whereas when you're giving when you're citing genuinely explanatory
reasons what you're providing is something which makes sense from no
point of view whatsoever
Justificatory Reasons and Intentions
\section{Justificatory Reasons and Intentions}
How is this relevant to our question?
Q
What is the mark that distinguishes actions?
A.2
Actions are events for which there are justifying reasons.
Do you understand the answers?
Are they one answer or two?
Among all the considerations which are, or might be, explanatory reasons for an action, what determines which are (the agent’s) justifying reasons?
Ayesha
Desire: I catch the bus.
Belief: Running is a way of arriving at the stop before the bus leaves.
Intention: I run to the bus stop.
Beatrice
Desire: I catch the bus.
Belief: Running is a way of geting the driver to wait by signalling my desire.
Intention: I run to the bus stop.
They have different justifying reasons. In virtue of what is this true?
In part it’s a matter of what they believe.
But not just this. After all, they might have the same beliefs and yet not
count the same things as reasons which justify their running.
(Ask each, Why did you run?)
so can we answer this question among all of the potential including
some of the actual considerations which would explain an action which
of those are among the agents justifying reasons by appealing to belief?
no we can't do that we definitely can't do that we can't do that steve
for the very simple reason that aisha and beatrice may have lots of
other beliefs as well
in particular aisha may well believe that
running is a way of getting the driver to wait by signaling her desire
but it still might not be among the justifying reasons that she has
it's also not going to be enough just to appeal to desire because in
both cases these are people who desire to get on the bus that's their
their firm desire they want to get on the bus right they're going to a
party in being they've got to get there before it gets too dark tonight
so they need we need to think about more than just the desires and the
beliefs we need to think about their intentions ...
what's important about the justificatory reason for aisha is not
merely the fact that she believes it but that this belief plays that
appropriate role in getting her to form the intention that she runs for
the bus it's not the mere fact of belief it's the role of belief in
shaping her intention that makes it the case that the thing she
believes perhaps wrongly that running is a way of arriving at the stop
before the bus is a justificatory reason for her action
likewise for
beatrice what makes it the case that running is a way of getting the
driver to wait by signaling her desire is a justificatory reason is the
fact that this belief plays an appropriate role in her forming the
intention
very clear very simple idea steve very simple idea you're
making it difficult by spelling it out so slowly oh philosophy thinking
in slow motion
Among all the considerations which are, or might be, explanatory reasons for an action, what determines which are (the agent’s) justifying reasons?
among all the considerations which are or might be explanatory reasons for
an action what determines which are the agents justifying reasons?
It’s those of her beliefs which lead to her forming the intention which guides her action.
My suggestion is that it‘s not just facts about her beliefs that‘s
part of the story ...
but it‘s facts about those of her beliefs which lead
to forming the intention.
but then you‘re like steve, Which intention?
when i say *the* intention that‘s very confusing
the intention which guides our action
Accepting the second answer (A.2) seems to commit us to accepting the first answer (A.1).
Of course there are probably ways to avoid this commitment.
(I didn’t offer an argument.)
So, more cautiously, let’s say that accepting A.2 would motivate accepting A.1
I haven’t said anything about the converse route.
Q
What is the mark that distinguishes actions?
A.2
Actions are events for which there are justifying reasons.
\section{Conclusion on Action (extended version)}
conclusion
In conclusion, ...
What is the mark that distinguishes actions?
Davidson’s View
It is intention (or justifying reasons).
Objection:
Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders
Bach’s objections from absent-minded, instinctive and impulive actions [??]
Frankfurt’s View
Action is ‘behaviour whose course is under the guidance of an agent’.
Two Problems:
What is guidance?
When is guidance ‘attributable to an agent’?
Consider that the spider’s movements walking on the web are guided by the web’s structure.
And similarly for your actions when driving on the roads.
(Guiding is not only something you do, but something that is done to you.)
Contrast Frankfurt, 1978 with Bach, 1978
‘though attempting to account for how action is initiated,
they fail to deal with how it is executed.
Nevertheless, I believe Causalism to be fundamentally correct’
\citep[p.~361]{bach:1978_representational}
Bach, 1978 p. 361
