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Lecture 02:
Mind & Reality
\def \ititle {Lecture 02}
\def \isubtitle {Mind & Reality}
\begin{center}
{\Large
\textbf{\ititle}: \isubtitle
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\iemail %
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Russell’s Principle of Acquaintance
\section{Russell’s Principle of Acquaintance}
\emph{Reading:} §Russell, B. (1910). Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 11:108–128
How do our thoughts connect to the things about which we think?
What sort of relation between a subject and an object has to obtain if the subject is able to think about the object?
But what is acquaintance?
Start with it’s formal properties ...
‘Acquaintance ... essentially consists in a relation between the mind and something other than the mind’
\citep[chapter 4]{Russell:1912ln}
Russell, 1912 Chapter 4
But which relation is acquaintance? ...
What else can we say about acquaintance?
‘we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths’
\citep[chapter 5]{Russell:1912ln}
Russell, 1912 chapter 5
What does this mean? Nothing, by itself. But Russell goes on to explain what he means:
Contrast: infer existence of a phone in your washing machine from the bumps vs opening it
and finding the phone.
Modes of acquaintance (?):
perception?
memory?
self-awareness?
attention?
‘knowledge by acquaintance, is essentially simpler than any knowledge of truths, and logically independent of knowledge of truths’
\citep[chapter 5]{Russell:1912ln}
Russell, 1912 chapter 5
So there's a contrast between K of things and K of truths.
What is Russell’s Principle of Acquaintance?
\emph{The Principle of Acquaintance}:
‘Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted’
\citep[p.~209]{Russell:1910fa}
Russell, 1910 [1963] p. 209
“All our knowledge, both knowledge of things and knowledge of truths, rests upon acquaintance as its foundation”
Russell, 1912 chapter 5
\section{Knowledge by Description}
\emph{Reading:} §Russell, B. (1910). Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 11:108–128
Russell’s objection to Russell
‘Thus when, for example, we make a statement about Julius Caesar,
it is plain that Julius Caesar himself is not before our minds,
since we are not acquainted with him.’
\citep[chapter 5]{Russell:1912ln}
Russell, 1912 chapter 5
What is the objection an objection to?
1. We can think about Julius Caesar.
2. We are not acquianted with Julius Caesar.
3. Therefore it’s untrue that
“All our knowledge, both knowledge of things and knowledge of truths, rests upon acquaintance as its foundation”
‘Thus when, for example, we make a statement about Julius Caesar,
it is plain that Julius Caesar himself is not before our minds,
since we are not acquainted with him.
We have in mind some description of Julius Caesar: 'the man who was assassinated on the Ides of March', 'the founder of the Roman Empire'
\citep[chapter 5]{Russell:1912ln}
Russell, 1912 chapter 5
And the description is what enables us to think about him.
two ways of linking thoughts to objects
acquaintance
‘we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths’
\citep[chapter 5]{Russell:1912ln}
Russell, 1912 chapter 5
knowledge by description
‘when we know that the property or properties in question belong to one object and
no more, we are said to have knowledge of that one object by description, whether
or not we are acquainted with the object.’
\citep[p.~220]{Russell:1910fa}
Russell, 1910 p. 220
So what was the problem this this argument?
1. We can think about Julius Caesar.
2. We are not acquianted with Julius Caesar.
3. Therefore it’s untrue that
“All our knowledge, both knowledge of things and knowledge of truths, rests upon acquaintance as its foundation”
So what was the problem this this argument?
This mustn’t be read as saying that acquaintance is involved in every case
because there is also knowledge by description.
summary
Russell’s principle of acquaintance
The objection: Julius Caesar
The reply: knowledge by description
new problem
Couldn’t it all be knowledge by description?
/ex/TorF/qq/You know Julius Caesar by acquaintance|You know Julius Caesar by description
/ex/q/What is the problem associated with Julius Caesar in this unit?
Russell’s Argument on Acquaintance
\section{Russell’s Argument on Acquaintance}
Recall the Principle ...
\emph{The Principle of Acquaintance}:
‘Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted’
\citep[p.~209]{Russell:1910fa}
Russell, 1910 [1963] p. 209
Structure of larger argument -- Russell’s own argument is interesting
but doesn’t go deep enough; we need to think more carefully about
why knowledge of reference is needed.
What is Russell’s argument?
It seems to me that the truth of this principle is evident as soon as the principle is understood’
\citep[pp.~210--11]{Russell:1910fa}.
Russell, 2010 pp. 210-11
Never talk about yourself. It’s always irrelevant.
But a real argument does follow ...
‘the theory that judgements consist of ideas ... is fundamentally mistaken.
The view seems to be that there is some mental existent which may be called the
‘idea’ of something outside the mind of the person who has the idea, and that,
since judgement is a mental event, its constituents must be constituents of the
mind of the person judging.
But in this view ideas become a veil between us and outside things --- we never really, in knowledge, attain //p. 212// to the things we are supposed to be knowing about, but only to the ideas of those things.
The relation of mind, idea, and object, on this view, is utterly obscure ...
‘the theory that judgements consist of ideas ... is fundamentally mistaken.
The relation of mind, idea, and object, on this view, is utterly obscure ...
I ... see no reason to believe that, when we are acquainted with an object,
there is in us something which can be called the ‘idea’ of the object.
On the contrary, I hold that acquaintance is wholly a relation, not demanding any such constituent of the mind as is supposed by advocates of ‘ideas’.’Russell, 1910 [1963] pp. 211–2
‘I think the theory that
judgements consist of ideas ... is fundamentally mistaken.
The view seems to be that there is some mental existent which may be called the
‘idea’ of something outside the mind of the person who has the idea, and that,
since judgement is a mental event, its constituents must be constituents of the
mind of the person judging.
But in this view ideas become a veil between us and
outside things—--we never really, in knowledge, attain //p. 212// to the things
we are supposed to be knowing about, but only to the ideas of those things.
The relation of mind, idea, and object, on this view, is utterly obscure ...
I ... see no reason to believe that, when we are acquainted with an object,
there is in us something which can be called the ‘idea’ of the object.
On the contrary, I hold that acquaintance is wholly a relation,
not demanding any such constituent of the mind as is supposed by
advocates of ‘ideas’’
\citep[pp.~211--12]{Russell:1910fa}.
This is hardly on a part with ‘evident as soon as it is understood’.
Either the Principle of Acquaintance is compatible with the theory of ideas
and so empty, or else it is not compatible with the theory of ideas and
so stands in need of justification.
Reconstruction of Russell’s argument
When things go well, our thoughts are about things in the world. [points of view]
Any theory of thought needs to elucidate the relation between a thoughts and and things.
Invoking ideas to do this makes matters more, not less, obscure.
Therefore:
The intentionality of thought consists at bottom in a relation between a thinker and an object.
Terminology: call this relation ‘acquaintance’.
It’s not much of an argument, but it’s interesting.
We have seen that Russell says two things. I don’t think they can both be true.
Can these both be true Mr R?
‘the truth of this principle is evident as soon as
the principle is understood’
\citep[pp.~210--11]{Russell:1910fa}.
Russell, 2010 pp. 210-11
I hold that acquaintance is wholly a relation,
not demanding any such constituent of the mind as is supposed by
advocates of ‘ideas’.’
Russell, 1910 [1963] pp. 211–2
/ex/TorF/qq/It is usually good to write about yourself in a philosophy essay|The main point of a philosophy essay is to express your opinions
/ex/TorF/qq/In general, acquaintance is a relation between a thinker and a thing (such as a rock or a person, perhaps)|In general, acquaintance is a relation between a thinker and an idea
The Argument from Massive Reduplication
\section{The Argument from Massive Reduplication}
\emph{Reading:} §Russell, B. (1910). Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 11:108–128, §pages 20--22 of Strawson, P. F. (1959). Individuals. Meuthen, London.
Neighbours.
We never met them (they don’t keep our kind of hours.)
[bitter rivals/minnie]
‘The vocalist is doing better today than she was yesterday.’
‘Yes, but it sounds like the drummer is all over the place again.’
Revelation: it’s a collective with rotating members
When we rely on knowledge by description,
we are always at risk
of not thinking about anything.
But this is an isolated problem.
Bad inference
1. On any given occasion, it is possible that I am wrong.
Therefore:
2. It is possible that I am invariably wrong.
Massive reduplication:
For all we know, there may be a distant
region of our universe with duplicates of everything around here.
1. Suppose you were not acquainted with anything at all.
2. Then all your thoughts would be based on knowledge by description.
3. But massive reduplication is possible for all we know.
4. Therefore: you might not ever be thinking about anything, for all we know.
Do you see how it follows
5. But we do know that you sometimes succeed in thinking about some things.
6. Therefore you are acquainted with at least one thing.
do you see how it follows (by contradiction)?
The possibility of massive reduplication provides us with
an argument for (something close to) Russell’s principle.
/ex/TorF/qq/Massive reduplication concerns the problem of duplicating large objects|Massive reduplication concerns the possibility that everything around here might be duplicated in a far-off part of the universe
/ex/q/Can you identify a potential objection to the objection from massive reduplication in this unit?
\section{Conclusion: Acquaintance and Massive Reduplication}
conclusion
In conclusion, ...
How do your thoughts connect to
the things about which you think?
Russell’s Principle of Acquaintance provides
one possible answer.
It may be possible to justify accepting
the Principle of Acquaintance by appeal to
the possibility of massive reduplication.
