\emph{Reading:} §Fodor, Jerry. ‘Observation Reconsidered’. Philosophy of Science 51, no. 1 (1984): 23–43., §Firestone, C. and Scholl, B. J. (2016). Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for “top-down” effects. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39., §Dustin Stokes. ‘Cognitive Penetrability of Perception’. Philosophy Compass 8, no. 7 (2013): 646–63. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12043.
\section{What Is Cognitive Penetration?}
Definition: to say that vision is cognitively penetrated is to say that ‘our beliefs, desires, emotions, actions, and even the languages we speak can directly influence what we see.’
Firestone & Scholl, 2016 p. 5
\citep[p.~5]{firestone:2016_cognition}
‘I see that Ayesha has a question.’
this is clearly not a case
Because I believe Ayesha is behind me, I turn around and see Beatrice.
this is clearly not a case
‘there is no single, uncontroversial definition of the target phenomenon’
Stokes 2013, p. 658
\citep[p.~658]{stokes:2013_cognitive}
step back and think about perception
case study: object tracking
Scholl and Pylyshyn, 1999
One of the functions of perception is to track objects.
But the perceiver’s information is often incomplete.
Scholl and Pylyshyn, 1999
How?
One of the functions of perception is to track objects.
But the perceiver’s information is often incomplete.
Despite this, humans can track objects quite well.
principles of object perception
INSERT what_is_cognitive_penetration-paperdrawn1.mp4 here
So what is cognitive penetration?
Sensory inputs provide incomplete information about objects.
Perceptual processes fill in (some of) the missing information
in accordance with principles specifying how objects behave.
Our question of cognitive penetration is:
Can anything you know or believe be used to fill in that missing information?
Or are there limits?
If you don’t like my way of setting things up, you can
always rely on other experts.
Definition: to say that vision is cognitively penetrated is to say that ‘our beliefs, desires, emotions, actions, and even the languages we speak can directly influence what we see.’
Firestone & Scholl, 2016 p. 5
\citep[p.~5]{firestone:2016_cognition}
‘there is no single, uncontroversial definition of the target phenomenon’
Stokes 2013, p. 658
\citep[p.~658]{stokes:2013_cognitive}
/ex/TorF/qq/One way of characterising the view that cognition penetrates visual perception is to say that our beliefs, desires, emotions and actions, and even the languages we speak can directly influence what we see.|There is no single, uncontroversial definition of cognitive penetration.
/ex/TorF/qq/We know that cognition penetrates visual perception because when I see that Ayesha has a question, what I see is influenced by what I believe.|We know that cognition penetrates visual perception because my belief that Ayesha is behind me can cause me to turn around and see her.
\section{The Significance of Cognitive Penetration}
\emph{Reading:} §Fodor, Jerry. ‘Observation Reconsidered’. Philosophy of Science 51, no. 1 (1984): 23–43., §Dustin Stokes. ‘Cognitive Penetrability of Perception’. Philosophy Compass 8, no. 7 (2013): 646–63. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12043., §Peirce, C. (1877). The fixation of belief. In Hartshorne, C. and Weiss, P., editors, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, volume 5. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., §Dewey, J. (1907). Reality and the criterion for the truth of ideas. Mind, 16(63):317–342.
\section{The Significance of Cognitive Penetration}
Observations can change theories.
But why is this obvious fact relevant?
[insert significance_paperdrawn1.mp4]
‘The [...] assumption identified and challenged by [some proponents of cogntive penetration],
is that perceptual observation [...]
is neutral with respect to the theories being tested; it can be used safely and reliably as evidence
for or against a theory.’
Stokes, 2013 p. 651
\citep[p.~651]{stokes:2013_cognitive}
But didn’t you just argue that perception was theory-laden?
By identifying the theory that lades our perceptions,
we can improve the value of our observations to the process of discovery.
We can understand why Aristotelian physics appears compelling,
and we can explain away the appearance of observations which support it
over Newtonian physics.
McCloskey et al, 1980 figure 2D
‘The [...] assumption identified and challenged by [some proponents of cogntive penetration], is that perceptual observation [...] is neutral with respect to the theories being tested; it can be used safely and reliably as evidence for or against a theory.’
Stokes, 2013 p. 651
This is not correct in the case of Aristotelian vs Newtownian mechanics.
But it’s close enough ...
More accurate: perceptual observation may side with one particular theory; but which theory it sides with is independent of which theory you hold.
pragmatists again
I want to stress that there are interesting theoretical positions on which
observation does indeed play no special role in confirming or rejecting theories ...
“truth … is distinguished from falsehood simply by this, that if acted on it should,
on full consideration, carry us to the point we aim at and not astray” (247, 5.387)
Peirce, 1877 p. 247 (5.387)
Peirce Fixation of Belief
“The criterion of the worth of the idea is thus the capacity of the
idea [...]
to operate in fulfilling the object for the sake of which it was projected.
Capacity of operation in this fashion is the test, measure, or criterion of truth.”
Dewey 1907, p. 341
{{Dewey, 1907 #279@341}}.
whether cognition penetrates perception matters for how observations relate to theories.
/ex/TorF/qq/If you deny that cognition penetrates perception you must also assert (on pain of inconsistency) that perception is theory neutral.|If you assert that cognition penetrates perception you must also deny (on pain of inconsistency) that observations can ever falsify theories.
\section{The Significance of Cognitive Penetration}
\emph{Reading:} §Fodor, Jerry. ‘Observation Reconsidered’. Philosophy of Science 51, no. 1 (1984): 23–43., §Dustin Stokes. ‘Cognitive Penetrability of Perception’. Philosophy Compass 8, no. 7 (2013): 646–63. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12043., §Peirce, C. (1877). The fixation of belief. In Hartshorne, C. and Weiss, P., editors, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, volume 5. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., §Dewey, J. (1907). Reality and the criterion for the truth of ideas. Mind, 16(63):317–342.
\section{The Significance of Cognitive Penetration}
Observations can change theories.
But why is this obvious fact relevant?
[insert significance_paperdrawn1.mp4]
‘The [...] assumption identified and challenged by [some proponents of cogntive penetration],
is that perceptual observation [...]
is neutral with respect to the theories being tested; it can be used safely and reliably as evidence
for or against a theory.’
Stokes, 2013 p. 651
\citep[p.~651]{stokes:2013_cognitive}
But didn’t you just argue that perception was theory-laden?
By identifying the theory that lades our perceptions,
we can improve the value of our observations to the process of discovery.
We can understand why Aristotelian physics appears compelling,
and we can explain away the appearance of observations which support it
over Newtonian physics.
McCloskey et al, 1980 figure 2D
‘The [...] assumption identified and challenged by [some proponents of cogntive penetration], is that perceptual observation [...] is neutral with respect to the theories being tested; it can be used safely and reliably as evidence for or against a theory.’
Stokes, 2013 p. 651
This is not correct in the case of Aristotelian vs Newtownian mechanics.
But it’s close enough ...
More accurate: perceptual observation may side with one particular theory; but which theory it sides with is independent of which theory you hold.
pragmatists again
I want to stress that there are interesting theoretical positions on which
observation does indeed play no special role in confirming or rejecting theories ...
“truth … is distinguished from falsehood simply by this, that if acted on it should,
on full consideration, carry us to the point we aim at and not astray” (247, 5.387)
Peirce, 1877 p. 247 (5.387)
Peirce Fixation of Belief
“The criterion of the worth of the idea is thus the capacity of the
idea [...]
to operate in fulfilling the object for the sake of which it was projected.
Capacity of operation in this fashion is the test, measure, or criterion of truth.”
Dewey 1907, p. 341
{{Dewey, 1907 #279@341}}.
whether cognition penetrates perception matters for how observations relate to theories.
/ex/TorF/qq/If you deny that cognition penetrates perception you must also assert (on pain of inconsistency) that perception is theory neutral.|If you assert that cognition penetrates perception you must also deny (on pain of inconsistency) that observations can ever falsify theories.
Let me explain how the idea that cognition penetrates perception
might undermine the Acquaintance View ...
[insert further_significance_paperdrawn1 here]
so where are we.
Does cognition penetrate perception?
If not, we are assured that perception is distinct from thought, and so there is no obstacle to the Acquaintance View.
If it does, we would need a further, as yet unprovided, theoretical reason to hold that perception is distinct from, and more fundamental than, thought.
How, if at all, do your thoughts influence your perceptions?
simple seeing
object tracking (perception involves filling in;
that requires something like a theory of objects;
can anything you know or believe contribute to that theory,
or is the theory proprietary to perception?)
