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\title {Mind and Reality \\ Lecture 04}
 
 
 
\maketitle
 
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\subsection{what\_is\_cognitive\_penetration}
 
 
\section{What Is Cognitive Penetration?}
 
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\subsection{slide-4}
\citep[p.~5]{firestone:2016_cognition}
 
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\subsection{slide-5}
this is clearly not a case
 
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\subsection{slide-8}
this is clearly not a case
 
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\subsection{slide-11}
\citep[p.~658]{stokes:2013_cognitive}
 
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\subsection{slide-25}
INSERT what_is_cognitive_penetration-paperdrawn1.mp4 here
 
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\subsection{slide-31}
If you don’t like my way of setting things up, you can always rely on other experts.
 
\citep[p.~5]{firestone:2016_cognition}
 
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\subsection{slide-32}
\citep[p.~658]{stokes:2013_cognitive}
 
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\subsection{significance}
 
 
\section{The Significance of Cognitive Penetration}
 
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\subsection{slide-34}
Observations can change theories.
 
But why is this obvious fact relevant? [insert significance_paperdrawn1.mp4]
 
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\subsection{slide-35}
\citep[p.~651]{stokes:2013_cognitive}
 
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\subsection{slide-38}
By identifying the theory that lades our perceptions, we can improve the value of our observations to the process of discovery.
 
We can understand why Aristotelian physics appears compelling,
 
and we can explain away the appearance of observations which support it over Newtonian physics.
 
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\subsection{slide-40}
This is not correct in the case of Aristotelian vs Newtownian mechanics. But it’s close enough ...
 
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\subsection{slide-42}
I want to stress that there are interesting theoretical positions on which observation does indeed play no special role in confirming or rejecting theories ...
 
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\subsection{slide-43}
Peirce Fixation of Belief
 
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\subsection{slide-44}
{{Dewey, 1907 #279@341}}.
 
--------
\subsection{significance}
 
 
\section{The Significance of Cognitive Penetration}
 
--------
\subsection{slide-47}
Observations can change theories.
 
But why is this obvious fact relevant? [insert significance_paperdrawn1.mp4]
 
--------
\subsection{slide-48}
\citep[p.~651]{stokes:2013_cognitive}
 
--------
\subsection{slide-51}
By identifying the theory that lades our perceptions, we can improve the value of our observations to the process of discovery.
 
We can understand why Aristotelian physics appears compelling,
 
and we can explain away the appearance of observations which support it over Newtonian physics.
 
--------
\subsection{slide-53}
This is not correct in the case of Aristotelian vs Newtownian mechanics. But it’s close enough ...
 
--------
\subsection{slide-55}
I want to stress that there are interesting theoretical positions on which observation does indeed play no special role in confirming or rejecting theories ...
 
--------
\subsection{slide-56}
Peirce Fixation of Belief
 
--------
\subsection{slide-57}
{{Dewey, 1907 #279@341}}.
 
--------
\subsection{further\_significance}
 
 
\section{The Further Significance of Cognitive Penetration}
 
--------
\subsection{slide-61}
Let me explain how the idea that cognition penetrates perception might undermine the Acquaintance View ...
 
[insert further_significance_paperdrawn1 here]
 
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\subsection{slide-62}
so where are we.
 
 
 
\section{Interim Conclusion: Cognitive Penetration}
 
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\subsection{slide-65}
In conclusion, ...
 
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\subsection{slide-67}
simple seeing
 
object tracking (perception involves filling in; that requires something like a theory of objects; can anything you know or believe contribute to that theory, or is the theory proprietary to perception?)
 
 
\def \ititle {Lecture 04}
 
\def \isubtitle {Mind \& Reality}
 
\begin{center}
 
{\Large
 
\textbf{\ititle}: \isubtitle
 
}
 
 
 
\iemail %
 
\end{center}
 
 
 
\section{What Is Cognitive Penetration?}
 
\emph{Reading:} §Fodor, Jerry. ‘Observation Reconsidered’. Philosophy of Science 51, no. 1 (1984): 23–43., §Firestone, C. and Scholl, B. J. (2016). Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for “top-down” effects. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39., §Dustin Stokes. ‘Cognitive Penetrability of Perception’. Philosophy Compass 8, no. 7 (2013): 646–63. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12043.
 
 
 
\section{The Significance of Cognitive Penetration}
 
\emph{Reading:} §Fodor, Jerry. ‘Observation Reconsidered’. Philosophy of Science 51, no. 1 (1984): 23–43., §Dustin Stokes. ‘Cognitive Penetrability of Perception’. Philosophy Compass 8, no. 7 (2013): 646–63. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12043., §Peirce, C. (1877). The fixation of belief. In Hartshorne, C. and Weiss, P., editors, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, volume 5. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., §Dewey, J. (1907). Reality and the criterion for the truth of ideas. Mind, 16(63):317–342.
 
 
 
\section{The Significance of Cognitive Penetration}
 
\emph{Reading:} §Fodor, Jerry. ‘Observation Reconsidered’. Philosophy of Science 51, no. 1 (1984): 23–43., §Dustin Stokes. ‘Cognitive Penetrability of Perception’. Philosophy Compass 8, no. 7 (2013): 646–63. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12043., §Peirce, C. (1877). The fixation of belief. In Hartshorne, C. and Weiss, P., editors, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, volume 5. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., §Dewey, J. (1907). Reality and the criterion for the truth of ideas. Mind, 16(63):317–342.
 
 
 
\section{The Further Significance of Cognitive Penetration}
 
\emph{Reading:} §Dustin Stokes. ‘Cognitive Penetrability of Perception’. Philosophy Compass 8, no. 7 (2013): 646–63. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12043.
 
 
 
\section{Interim Conclusion: Cognitive Penetration}
 
\vfill
\begin{minipage}{\columnwidth}
\section{Exercises}
These exercises will be discussed in seminars the week after this lecture.
The numbers below refer to the numbered exercises in the course textbook, e.g.\ `1.1' refers to exercise 1.1. on page 39 of the second edition of \emph{Language, Proof and Logic}. Exercises marked `*' are optional.
 
\begin{quote}
/ex/TorF/qq/One way of characterising the view that cognition penetrates visual perception is to say that our beliefs, desires, emotions and actions, and even the languages we speak can directly influence what we see.|There is no single, uncontroversial definition of cognitive penetration.
 
/ex/TorF/qq/We know that cognition penetrates visual perception because when I see that Ayesha has a question, what I see is influenced by what I believe.|We know that cognition penetrates visual perception because my belief that Ayesha is behind me can cause me to turn around and see her.
 
/ex/TorF/qq/If you deny that cognition penetrates perception you must also assert (on pain of inconsistency) that perception is theory neutral.|If you assert that cognition penetrates perception you must also deny (on pain of inconsistency) that observations can ever falsify theories.
 
/ex/TorF/qq/If you deny that cognition penetrates perception you must also assert (on pain of inconsistency) that perception is theory neutral.|If you assert that cognition penetrates perception you must also deny (on pain of inconsistency) that observations can ever falsify theories.
 
\end{quote}
\end{minipage}

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\title {Mind and Reality \\ Lecture 04}
 
\maketitle
 
\section{What Is Cognitive Penetration?}
\emph{Reading:} §Fodor, Jerry. ‘Observation Reconsidered’. Philosophy of Science 51, no. 1 (1984): 23–43., §Firestone, C. and Scholl, B. J. (2016). Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for “top-down” effects. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39., §Dustin Stokes. ‘Cognitive Penetrability of Perception’. Philosophy Compass 8, no. 7 (2013): 646–63. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12043.
 
\section{What Is Cognitive Penetration?}
/ex/TorF/qq/One way of characterising the view that cognition penetrates visual perception is to say that our beliefs, desires, emotions and actions, and even the languages we speak can directly influence what we see.|There is no single, uncontroversial definition of cognitive penetration.
/ex/TorF/qq/We know that cognition penetrates visual perception because when I see that Ayesha has a question, what I see is influenced by what I believe.|We know that cognition penetrates visual perception because my belief that Ayesha is behind me can cause me to turn around and see her.
 
\section{The Significance of Cognitive Penetration}
\emph{Reading:} §Fodor, Jerry. ‘Observation Reconsidered’. Philosophy of Science 51, no. 1 (1984): 23–43., §Dustin Stokes. ‘Cognitive Penetrability of Perception’. Philosophy Compass 8, no. 7 (2013): 646–63. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12043., §Peirce, C. (1877). The fixation of belief. In Hartshorne, C. and Weiss, P., editors, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, volume 5. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., §Dewey, J. (1907). Reality and the criterion for the truth of ideas. Mind, 16(63):317–342.
 
\section{The Significance of Cognitive Penetration}
/ex/TorF/qq/If you deny that cognition penetrates perception you must also assert (on pain of inconsistency) that perception is theory neutral.|If you assert that cognition penetrates perception you must also deny (on pain of inconsistency) that observations can ever falsify theories.
 
\section{The Significance of Cognitive Penetration}
\emph{Reading:} §Fodor, Jerry. ‘Observation Reconsidered’. Philosophy of Science 51, no. 1 (1984): 23–43., §Dustin Stokes. ‘Cognitive Penetrability of Perception’. Philosophy Compass 8, no. 7 (2013): 646–63. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12043., §Peirce, C. (1877). The fixation of belief. In Hartshorne, C. and Weiss, P., editors, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, volume 5. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., §Dewey, J. (1907). Reality and the criterion for the truth of ideas. Mind, 16(63):317–342.
 
\section{The Significance of Cognitive Penetration}
/ex/TorF/qq/If you deny that cognition penetrates perception you must also assert (on pain of inconsistency) that perception is theory neutral.|If you assert that cognition penetrates perception you must also deny (on pain of inconsistency) that observations can ever falsify theories.
 
\section{The Further Significance of Cognitive Penetration}
\emph{Reading:} §Dustin Stokes. ‘Cognitive Penetrability of Perception’. Philosophy Compass 8, no. 7 (2013): 646–63. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12043.
 
\section{The Further Significance of Cognitive Penetration}
 
\section{Interim Conclusion: Cognitive Penetration}
 
\section{Interim Conclusion: Cognitive Penetration}