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\title {Mind and Reality \\ Week 05 Questions}
 
\maketitle
 

Week 05 Questions:

Mind & Reality

\def \ititle {Week 05 Questions}
\def \isubtitle {Mind & Reality}
\begin{center}
{\Large
\textbf{\ititle}: \isubtitle
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\section{Recording of Whole-Class Live Question Session}
\emph{Reading:} §Voss, Ursula, Karin Schermelleh-Engel, Jennifer Windt, Clemens Frenzel, and Allan Hobson. ‘Measuring Consciousness in Dreams: The Lucidity and Consciousness in Dreams Scale’. Consciousness and Cognition 22, no. 1 (2013): 8–21. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2012.11.001., §Cote, Kimberly A. ‘Probing Awareness during Sleep with the Auditory Odd-Ball Paradigm’. International Journal of Psychophysiology, Event-related Potential Measure of Information Processing During Sleep, 46, no. 3 (2002): 227–41. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-8760(02)00114-9.
 
\section{Recording of Whole-Class Live Question Session}

Philosophy is done by asking questions.

Hemli

In the section about why senses aren’t descriptions

Assume senses are descriptions.

Then equivalent Fregean proposition would be used to distinguish the contents of these mental states:

your thought that

Alfred Eisenstaedt lived in Jackson Heights;

and your thought that

The photojournalist who mixed up his cameras while photographing Marilyn Monroe lived in Jackson Heights.

But these are not the same thought.

So senses are not descriptions.

Kripke, 1980

Hemli

In the section about why senses aren’t descriptions, I do not understand why counterfactual possibilities and other possible worlds are relevant.

We live in this world and not any other possible world, therefore we do not need to consider other possible worlds when trying to figure out what propositions are on this one.

For example, we DO live in the world where Alfred Eisenstaedt mixed up the cameras when taking photos of Monroe, therefore the two propositions ARE equivalent.

Assume senses are descriptions.

Then equivalent Fregean proposition would be used to distinguish the contents of these mental states:

your thought that

Alfred Eisenstaedt lived in Jackson Heights;

and your thought that

The photojournalist who mixed up his cameras while photographing Marilyn Monroe lived in Jackson Heights.

But these are not the same thought.

So senses are not descriptions.

Kripke, 1980

another attempt

Suppose you know that Alfred Eisenstaedt lived in Jackson Heights.

I ask you, ‘Is is possible that Martha Holmes could have been the photojournalist who mixed up her cameras while photographing Marilyn Monroe?’

You reply that it is.

But if senses are descriptions,

and if the sense of Alfred Eisenstaedt is ‘the photojournalist who mixed up his cameras ...’,

then your reply is false.

Hemli

In the section about why senses aren’t descriptions, I do not understand why counterfactual possibilities and other possible worlds are relevant.

We live in this world and not any other possible world, therefore we do not need to consider other possible worlds when trying to figure out what propositions are on this one.

For example, we DO live in the world where Alfred Eisenstaedt mixed up the cameras when taking photos of Monroe, therefore the two propositions ARE equivalent.

Yes, in the sense that they have the same truth value. No, in the sense that they are not necessarily equivalent.
I claim that we do. Because we think about other possible worlds.

Sam W

Can you go over what you mean by "utterances" again?

utterance - sentence - proposition

an utterance is a gesture

with phonetic structure

which expresses a proposition

in virtue of the phonetic structure corresponding to a sequence of words comprising a sentence.

Josh D

could you please go over how best to answer Q3: "What, if anything, could we conclude from the discovery of perception without awareness about the function of consciousness?"

You are the philosopher

modest conclusion: the function of consciousness cannot be to enable agents to guide their actions

ambitious conclusion (Dretske): the function of consciousness is to enable agents to have justifying reasons for their actions

(!?!) the function of feathers cannot be to enable reproductive success

Solyman

Wouldn’t a better experiment other than the split brain and blindsight would be sleepwalking, where the subject is wholly unaware of the external objects but perceives with direct actions that are in nature successive?

Solyman

Wouldn’t a better experiment other than the split brain and blindsight would be sleepwalking, where the subject is wholly unaware of the external objects but perceives with direct actions that are in nature successive?

‘Dreams are altered states of consciousness’

(Voss et al, 2013 p. 8; see also Cote et al, 2002)

Solyman (2)

Also hypnosis where the subject is unconsciously aware and does the exact same.

key distinction

not aware of the pen

vs

not knowing (or not remembering) that you saw the pen

We are able to establish the disaggregated selves more evidently in these cases of awareness with a minimised expected rate of flaws.

Adam

What exactly does token mean in the context of outcomes of actions?

more questions