What is metaphysically necessary for your survival? Or, to put the question as Olson (2019) does, ‘If a person exists at one time and something exists at another time, under what possible circumstances is it the case that the person is the thing?’

Reading (optional): Olson, E. T. (2019). Personal Identity. In Zalta, E. N., editor, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, fall 2019 edition.

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What is the question of personal identity a question about? One quite natural suggestion: it is about numerical identity. The question is about the circumstances under which a person at one time is numerically identical to a person at another time. But can this be right? According to David Lewis, Numerical ‘identity is utterly simple and unproblematic.’ If Lewis is right, either there is no problem of personal identity, or, if there is a problem, it is not a problem about numerical identity.

Reading (optional): Olson, E. T. (2019). Personal Identity. In Zalta, E. N., editor, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, fall 2019 edition.

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According to psychological continuity views of personal identity, necessarily, a person existing at one time is a person existing at another time if and only if the first mentioned person can, at the first time, remember an experience the second mentioned person has at the second time, or vice versa.

Reading (optional): Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

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