Goodman showed that you can turn a better inductive argument into a much worse one by changing a predicate from, say, green to grue. This raises the question: why is the new argument worse than the original?

Reading (optional):

• Goodman, Nelson. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Harvard University Press, 1983. (https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?q=goodman+riddle)
• Israel, Rami. ‘Two Interpretations of “Grue” - or How to Misunderstand the New Riddle of Induction’. Analysis 64, no. 4 (2004): 335–39.

--- do one micro task for this unit

Goodman’s puzzle (‘new riddle’) about grue shows that how good an inductive argument something is does not depend only on the argument’s form. Relatedly, in ‘Hempel’s Ravens’ we saw an obstacle to characterising the relation between an observation and a conclusion when the observation is evidence for the conclusion in purely formal terms. These considerations indicate that there cannot be a purely formal theory of inductive reasoning.

Reading (optional):

• Chapter 3 of Godfrey-Smith, Peter. Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.
• Godfrey-Smith, Peter. ‘Goodman’s Problem and Scientific Methodology’. The Journal of Philosophy 100, no. 11 (2003): 573–90.
• Goodman, Nelson. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Harvard University Press, 1983. (https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?q=goodman+riddle)

Does the demonstration that there is no formal theory of inductive validity allow us to conclude that inductive validity is irreductible is deductive validity? No. There is no formal theory of deductive reasoning; and there are as yet unrefuted attempts to provide such reductions.

Goodman’s ‘New Riddle’ about grue and induction has a straightforward solution. What’s interesting about it isn’t that we don’t know how to solve it; it’s what the solution tells us about the relation between an observation and a theory when the observation is evidence for the theory.

Reading (optional):

• Chapters 3 and 14 of Godfrey-Smith, Peter. Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.
• Godfrey-Smith, Peter. ‘Goodman’s Problem and Scientific Methodology’. The Journal of Philosophy 100, no. 11 (2003): 573–90.
• Israel, Rami. ‘Two Interpretations of “Grue” - or How to Misunderstand the New Riddle of Induction’. Analysis 64, no. 4 (2004): 335–39.
• Goodman, Nelson. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Harvard University Press, 1983. (https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?q=goodman+riddle)

Whether an observation is evidence for a conclusion can depend on the procedure followed in making the observation.

Reading (optional):

• Chapters 3 and 14 of Godfrey-Smith, Peter. Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.
• Hempel, Carl G. ‘Studies in the Logic of Confirmation (I.)’. Mind 54, no. 213 (1945): 1–26.
• Hempel, Carl G. ‘The White Shoe: No Red Herring’. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18, no. 3 (1967): 239–40. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/18.3.239.

The relation between an observation and theory when the observation is evidence for the theory can not be characterisated in purely formal terms [from grue]; nor is it just a matter of the observation being an instance of the theory [from Hempel’s ravens/Ayesha’s traffic lights]. Instead, whether this relation obtains depends on how the observation is made: there must be no bias, and a good procedure must have been followed in making the observation.

Thanks to one ten films (Pakistan) for the apple.

Reading (optional): Chapters 3 and 14 of Godfrey-Smith, Peter. Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.