Mind and Reality

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A course at the University of Warwick.

Week 07: Action

Commencing Monday 16th November 2020

Seminar Task on yyrama

Note that the seminar tasks are typically on topics from previous weeks.

Not sure what to do? Check this guide to the seminar tasks (this is the same each week).

Live Online Whole-Class Meeting

Recorded Lectures

Not sure what to do with the lectures? Check this guide to using lectures (this is the same each week).

In-Lecture Micro Tasks on Zoxiy

Complete these while studying the recorded lectures, ideally with a partner. Once you have followed the lectures, you will already have done these.

Not sure how to complete the in-lecture micro tasks? Check this guide to the micro tasks (this is the same each week).

Assessed work to submit

  • Questions for the take-home exam should be released this week, I think.
  • Check the deadline on tabula. (Tabula is the only authoritative source for deadlines.)
  • Submit your work using tabula.

Please remember that all assessed work will only be marked if you submit it using tabula.

Optional reading from the lectures

These are the readings from this week’s lectures. These are the same as the readings listed in the lecture outlines. You are not required to do any of this reading. You may want to do attempt some of this reading in advance, or you might read it as part of your revision. The only required reading is that associated with the seminar tasks.

  • Frankfurt, Harry G. ‘The Problem of Action’. American Philosophical Quarterly 15, no. 2 (1978): 157–62.
  • Jackson, Robert R., and Fiona R. Cross. ‘Spider Cognition’. In Advances in Insect Physiology, edited by Jérôme Casas, 41:115–74. Spider Physiology and Behaviour. Academic Press, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-415919-8.00003-3.
  • Buehler, D. (2019). Flexible occurrent control. Philosophical Studies, 176(8):2119–2137.
  • Bach, Kent. ‘A Representational Theory of Action’. Philosophical Studies 34, no. 4 (1978): 361–79. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00364703.
  • Bratman, M. E. (1984). Two faces of intention. The Philosophical Review, 93(3):375–405.
  • Dretske, F. (2006). Perception without awareness. In Gendler, T. S. and Hawthorne, J. O., editors, Perceptual Experience, pages 147–180. OUP, Oxford.
  • Alvarez, Maria. ‘Reasons for Action: Justification, Motivation, Explanation’. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2017. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2017. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/.

What the Lectures Cover in Week 07

Lecture 11

Recap: Action

What is the mark that distinguishes actions? According to the view introduced in the last lecture, the Standard Story, it is intention.

Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders

1. There is a contrast between actions and mere happenings in the lives of spiders. 2. The contrast in the lives of humans is the same. 3. Spiders do not have intentions, nor do they deliberate about what to do. Therefore (from 1 & 3): 4. The contrast in the case of spiders cannot be explicated by appeal to intention. Therefore (from 2 & 4): 5. The contrast in the case of humans cannot be explicated by appeal to intention.

Reading (optional): Frankfurt, Harry G. ‘The Problem of Action’. American Philosophical Quarterly 15, no. 2 (1978): 157–62.

Interim Conclusion on Spiders

Frankfurt offers an objection to the Standard Story and proposes an alternative: action is ‘behaviour whose course is under the guidance of an agent’

Reading (optional): Frankfurt, Harry G. ‘The Problem of Action’. American Philosophical Quarterly 15, no. 2 (1978): 157–62.

Lecture 12

Are We Sure Spiders Don’t Have Intentions?

Stalking a spitting spider, [...] Portia executes a planned detour’ (Jackson & Cross, 2011).

Reading (optional):

  • Jackson, Robert R., and Fiona R. Cross. ‘Spider Cognition’. In Advances in Insect Physiology, edited by Jérôme Casas, 41:115–74. Spider Physiology and Behaviour. Academic Press, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-415919-8.00003-3.
  • Buehler, D. (2019). Flexible occurrent control. Philosophical Studies, 176(8):2119–2137.

Bach’s Objection

1. Ducking under a flying object is an action. 2. When you duck under a flying object, there is no intention you are acting on. Therefore: 3. Intention is not the mark that distinguishes actions.

Reading (optional):

  • Bach, Kent. ‘A Representational Theory of Action’. Philosophical Studies 34, no. 4 (1978): 361–79. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00364703.
  • Bratman, M. E. (1984). Two faces of intention. The Philosophical Review, 93(3):375–405.

Conclusion on Action

What is the mark that distinguishes your actions from events which merely happen to you? According to the Standard View, it is intention: those events which are appropriately guided by your intentions are actions; the other events are things that merely happen to you. We have considered two objections to the Standard View, one due to Frankfurt and the other to Bach. Because both objections depend on premises which we could not establish as truths, we should not accept either objection--at least not yet. The Standard View is therefore the best answer we have found so far.

Explanatory vs Justificatory Reasons

Explanatory reasons are considerations which explain why something happened. Justificatory reasons are considerations in the light of which an action appeared reasonable or desirable from the agent’s point of view.

Reading (optional):

  • Dretske, F. (2006). Perception without awareness. In Gendler, T. S. and Hawthorne, J. O., editors, Perceptual Experience, pages 147–180. OUP, Oxford.
  • Alvarez, Maria. ‘Reasons for Action: Justification, Motivation, Explanation’. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2017. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2017. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/.

Justificatory Reasons and Intentions

Consider two answers to our question, What is the mark that distinguishes actions? [A1] It is intention. [A2] Actions are events for which there are justifying reasons. Are these incompatible answers, or are they two ways of saying the same thing?

Conclusion on Action (extended version)

What is the mark that distinguishes your actions from events which merely happen to you? According to the Standard View, it is intention: those events which are appropriately guided by your intentions are actions; the other events are things that merely happen to you. We have considered two objections to the Standard View, one due to Frankfurt and the other to Bach. Because both objections depend on premises which we could not establish as truths, we should not accept either objection--at least not yet. We therefore returned to the Standard View. As we saw, there is a way to elaborate the Standard View by invoking justifying reasons. This may strengthen our confidence in the Standard View’s correctness.

Week 06 Questions

Recording of Whole-Class Live Question Session

The whole-class live online question session in is based on questions on the topic of this weeks’ lectures posed in advance in the teams channel.

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Last updated at Thu Dec 10 2020 22:19:42 GMT+0000 (Greenwich Mean Time)