Mind and Reality

--- lecturer: [email protected]

A course at the University of Warwick.

Week 10: Revision and Extensions

Commencing Monday 7th December 2020

Seminar Task on yyrama

Note that the seminar tasks are typically on topics from previous weeks.

Not sure what to do? Check this guide to the seminar tasks (this is the same each week).

Live Online Whole-Class Meeting

Recorded Lectures

Not sure what to do with the lectures? Check this guide to using lectures (this is the same each week).

In-Lecture Micro Tasks on Zoxiy

Complete these while studying the recorded lectures, ideally with a partner. Once you have followed the lectures, you will already have done these.

Not sure how to complete the in-lecture micro tasks? Check this guide to the micro tasks (this is the same each week).

Assessed work to submit

There is no assessed work due this week. (But to be sure, please check on tabula as this is the only authoritative source for deadlines.)

Optional reading from the lectures

These are the readings from this week’s lectures. These are the same as the readings listed in the lecture outlines. You are not required to do any of this reading. You may want to do attempt some of this reading in advance, or you might read it as part of your revision. The only required reading is that associated with the seminar tasks.

  • Philosophy Marking Criteria, https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/intranets/undergraduate/exams_essays/marking_scheme
  • Sainsbury, R. M. ‘Russell on Acquaintance’. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 20 (March 1986): 219–44. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0957042X00004156.
  • Shoemaker, David. ‘Personal Identity and Ethics’. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2019. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2019. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/identity-ethics/.
  • Martín, Andrés, Javier Chambeaud, and José Barraza. ‘The Effect of Object Familiarity on the Perception of Motion’. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 41, no. 2 (April 2015): 283–88. https://doi.org/10.1037/xhp0000027.
  • Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
  • Buchanan, Allen. ‘Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem’. Philosophy & Public Affairs 17, no. 4 (1988): 277–302.
  • Russell, B. (1910). Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 11:108–128
  • Campbell, J. (2002). Reference and Consciousness. Oxford: OUP
  • Perry, J. (1979). The problem of the essential indexical. Nous, 13(1):3–21.
  • Kaplan, D. (1989). Demonstratives. In Almog, J., Perry, J., and Wettstein, H., editors, Themes from Kaplan. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
  • Bach, Kent. ‘A Representational Theory of Action’. Philosophical Studies 34, no. 4 (1978): 361–79. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00364703.
  • Bratman, M. E. (1984). Two faces of intention. The Philosophical Review, 93(3):375–405.
  • Dickinson, A. and Balleine, B. (1994). Motivational control of goal-directed action. Animal Learning & Behavior, 22(1):1–18.
  • Nelson, Michael. ‘Existence’. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2020. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2020. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/existence/.
  • Efird, David. Is Timothy Williamson a Necessary Existent? Modality. Oxford University Press. Accessed 10 December 2020. https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.001.0001/acprof-9780199565818-chapter-6.
  • Williamson, Timothy. ‘Necessary Existents’. In Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, edited by A. O’Hear, 269–87. Cambridge University Press, 2002.
  • Crane, Tim. The Objects of Thought. Oxford University Press, 2013.

What the Lectures Cover in Week 10

Lecture 17

How to Revise: General Tips

Revision is the process of consolidating, integrating and extending your knowledge. Enjoy revision by being selective.

Reading (optional): Philosophy Marking Criteria, https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/intranets/undergraduate/exams_essays/marking_scheme

How to Do the Assessment

Answer the question.

Reading (optional): Philosophy Marking Criteria, https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/intranets/undergraduate/exams_essays/marking_scheme

How to Revise: the Topics

This section provides brief suggestions on how to revise the individual questions for Mind & Reality.

Reading (optional):

  • Sainsbury, R. M. ‘Russell on Acquaintance’. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 20 (March 1986): 219–44. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0957042X00004156.
  • Shoemaker, David. ‘Personal Identity and Ethics’. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2019. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2019. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/identity-ethics/.
  • Martín, Andrés, Javier Chambeaud, and José Barraza. ‘The Effect of Object Familiarity on the Perception of Motion’. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 41, no. 2 (April 2015): 283–88. https://doi.org/10.1037/xhp0000027.
  • Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
  • Buchanan, Allen. ‘Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem’. Philosophy & Public Affairs 17, no. 4 (1988): 277–302.

Reconstructing Arguments for Distinguishing Sense and Reference

A key part of your revision is ensuring that you understand various arguments well enough to reconstruct them. One approach to doing this involves identifying what the premises are, and which conclusions depend on which premises.

Indexicals and Demonstratives

“When you and I entertain the [thought we might each express by saying] "A bear is about to attack me," we behave similarly. We both roll up in a ball and try to be as still as possible ... When you and I both apprehend the thought that I am about to be attacked by a bear, we behave differently. I roll up in a ball, you run to get help” (Perry, 1977 p. 494).

Reading (optional):

  • Russell, B. (1910). Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 11:108–128
  • Campbell, J. (2002). Reference and Consciousness. Oxford: OUP
  • Perry, J. (1979). The problem of the essential indexical. Nous, 13(1):3–21.
  • Kaplan, D. (1989). Demonstratives. In Almog, J., Perry, J., and Wettstein, H., editors, Themes from Kaplan. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Lecture 18

Action: Recap

We are stuck on two questions. Do spiders have intentions? And when I duck to avoid a flying object, am I acting on any intention?

Reading (optional):

  • Bach, Kent. ‘A Representational Theory of Action’. Philosophical Studies 34, no. 4 (1978): 361–79. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00364703.
  • Bratman, M. E. (1984). Two faces of intention. The Philosophical Review, 93(3):375–405.

When Philosophical Methods Fail

Using philosophical methods alone can provide some knowledge, but there are limits. What are philosophical methods, and why are they so limited?

Two Kinds of Motivational State

Discoveries in animal learning theory enable us to distinguish desires from aversion and other primary motivational states. Indeed, your desires can be incompatible with your aversions (and with primary motivational states) in the sense that you can desire to eat something to which you are averse. This shows that are at least two systems of motivational states in rats or humans.

Experience Is the Key

‘primary motivational states, such as hunger, do not determine the value of an instrumental goal directly; rather, animals have to learn about the value of a commodity in a particular motivational state through direct experience with it in that state’ (Dickinson & Balleine, 1994 p. 7).

Reading (optional): Dickinson, A. and Balleine, B. (1994). Motivational control of goal-directed action. Animal Learning & Behavior, 22(1):1–18.

Intention and Motivational States

We can dissociate at least two kinds of motivational state involved in causing action. These are linked to different patterns of explanation. Intentions (as well as beliefs and desires) play a role in one pattern of explanation, but not in the other. This allows us to conclude that intention is not the mark of all action even while recognising that there is more than one kind of distinction to be made between your actions and events which merely happen to you.

Conclusion on Action, Intention and Motivational States

Different marks distinguish different kinds of action. To find the marks, identify the patterns of explanation.

Week 09 Questions

Recording of Whole-Class Live Question Session

The whole-class live online question session in is based on questions on the topic of this weeks’ lectures posed in advance in the teams channel. I apologise for the period of bad sound towards the end.

Reading (optional):

  • Nelson, Michael. ‘Existence’. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2020. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2020. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/existence/.
  • Efird, David. Is Timothy Williamson a Necessary Existent? Modality. Oxford University Press. Accessed 10 December 2020. https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.001.0001/acprof-9780199565818-chapter-6.
  • Williamson, Timothy. ‘Necessary Existents’. In Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, edited by A. O’Hear, 269–87. Cambridge University Press, 2002.
  • Crane, Tim. The Objects of Thought. Oxford University Press, 2013.

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Last updated at Thu Dec 10 2020 22:19:42 GMT+0000 (Greenwich Mean Time)