Propositions Individuate Contents

We distinguish mental states with different contents all the time in everyday life. But what distinguishes (or, better, to individuates) their contents?

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Propositions

We use propositions to individuate the contents of mental states. But what are propositions?

Reading (optional):

• McGrath, Matthew and Devin Frank, "Propositions", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/propositions/
• King, Jeffrey C. ‘Structured Propositions’. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2019. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2019. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/propositions-structured/

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Frege and Propositions

What distinguishes the contents of mental states? We have seen that the answer is: propositions. Propositions stand to mental states roughly as numbers stand to weights or temperatures. But what kind of propositions could we use to distinguish the contents of mental states? We already saw that Lewisian propositions (sets of possible worlds) are not so useful. Frege’s argument about sense and reference establishes that Russellian propositions are likewise not sufficient to make all the distinctions between contents that we need.

Reading (optional):

• Frege, G. (1980). Letter to jourdain. In Kaal, Hans (trans), Philosophical and mathematical correspondence, pages 78–80. (Find the letter online by searching for the terms ‘frege’, ’etna’ and ‘ateb’.)
• Section 3.1.1 and the first paragraph of Section 3.2 of Zalta, Edward N., "Gottlob Frege", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.)

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Why Senses Aren’t Descriptions

Senses cannot be descriptions. At least not if we are to use Fregean propositions to distinguish the contents of mental states. For if senses were descriptions, we would be forced to use the same Fregean proposition to capture the contents of two non-equivalent thoughts.

Reading (optional):

• Kripke, S. A. (1980). Naming and necessity. Library of philosophy and logic. Blackwell: Oxford, rev. and enlarged edition.
• §2.1 of Michaelson, Eliot, and Marga Reimer. ‘Reference’. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2019. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2019. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/reference/.

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Conclusion on Senses and Reference (So Far)

We have a convincing argument for postulating senses. But we also have a problem. ‘[A]ll that anyone has been able to think of is that different [senses] are [...] descriptions’ (Campbell, 2011 p. 340) And yet, as we have seen, senses cannot be descrpitions (Kripke, 1980).

Reading (optional):

• Kripke, S. A. (1980). Naming and necessity. Library of philosophy and logic. Blackwell: Oxford, rev. and enlarged edition.
• Campbell, J. (2011). Visual Attention and the Epistemic Role of Consciousness. In Mole, C., Smithies, D., and Wu, W., editors, Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays, page 323. Oxford University Press.

Action: The Question

‘The problem of action is to explicate the contrast between what an agent does and what merely happens to him’ (Frankfurt, 1978 p. 157).

Reading (optional):

• Frankfurt, Harry G. ‘The Problem of Action’. American Philosophical Quarterly 15, no. 2 (1978): 157–62.
• Davidson, D. (1971). Agency. In Binkley, R., Bronaugh, R., and Marras, A., editors, Agent, Action, and Reason,, pages 3–25. University of Toronto Press, Toronto. Reprinted in Davidson, D. (1980) Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Action: Three Basic Principles

Discussion about action should be informed by three basic principles. Actions have hierarchical structures. Actions are individuated by outcomes. And one action can have multiple descriptions.

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Causes of Action: Belief and Desire

In order to predict a person’s next action, what is the minimum you need to know? Plausibly this includes what the person believes about actions available to her and their consequences; and also how desirable the person finds the various consequences.

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Intention

Belief and desire alone are not sufficient for action. But beliefs and desires do shape deliberation about what to do. Deliberation characteristically results in intention. And intentions control action.

Reading (optional):

• Davidson, D. (1978 [1980]). Intending. In Essays on Actions and Events, pages 83–102. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
• Bratman, M. E. (1985). Davidson’s theory of intention. In Vermazen, B. and Hintikka, M., editors, Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events, pages 13–26. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Reprinted in Bratman, M. (1999) Faces of Intention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (pp. 209–224).

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Interim Conclusion on Action

What is the mark that distinguishes actions? It is intention.

Reading (optional): Frankfurt, Harry G. ‘The Problem of Action’. American Philosophical Quarterly 15, no. 2 (1978): 157–62.

Recording of Whole-Class Live Question Session

The whole-class live online question session in is based on questions on the topic of this weeks’ lectures posed in advance in the teams channel.

Reading (optional):

• Voss, Ursula, Karin Schermelleh-Engel, Jennifer Windt, Clemens Frenzel, and Allan Hobson. ‘Measuring Consciousness in Dreams: The Lucidity and Consciousness in Dreams Scale’. Consciousness and Cognition 22, no. 1 (2013): 8–21. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2012.11.001.
• Cote, Kimberly A. ‘Probing Awareness during Sleep with the Auditory Odd-Ball Paradigm’. International Journal of Psychophysiology, Event-related Potential Measure of Information Processing During Sleep, 46, no. 3 (2002): 227–41. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-8760(02)00114-9.